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Abstract
The tendency to throw controls at perceived and real system vulnerabilities, coupled with the likelihood
of these controls being technical in nature, has the propensity to favour security over usability.
However there is little evidence of increased assurance and it could encourage work stoppages or
deviations that keep honest users from engaging with the system. The conflicting balance of trust and
controls, and the challenge of turning that balance into clear requirements, creates an environment
that alienates users and feeds the paranoia of actors who assume more ownership of the system than
necessary. Security therefore becomes an inhibitor rather than an enabler for the community. This
paper looks at measuring the balance of an organisation’s or a community’s risk appetite with the risk
attitudes of its members in the early stages of IS development. It suggests how the dials of assurance
can be influenced by the levers of good systems practice to create a cultural shift to trusting the users.

Keywords: Security, risk, requirements, trust, non-functional.

1.0

Introduction

The importance of secure systems is increasing with the broad range of technological
advancements within every domain of human society (Dubois and Mouratidis, 2010)
not least with the developing ubiquity and pervasiveness of the Internet of Things
(O’Neill, 2014).

As the sophistication of security threats continues to evolve,

organisations must take steps toward preventing the losses from these threats (John,
2000).

The increase in technology-driven services is matched by an increasingly diverse
range of stakeholders in the systems that provide or are involved with those services
(Alexander, 2007). Security always assumes some degree of trust in its mechanisms
(Dubois and Mouratidis, 2010). Trust is a state of positive expectation that one’s

vulnerabilities will not be exploited (Riegelsberger, Sasse, and McCarthy, 2005). So,
in an attempt to engender the desired trust, all software-based systems have to
compensate for an environment over which the law of requisite variety (Ashby, 1957)
will allow them little control. The various elements that must struggle for the control
of the system within the environment – stakeholders, users, relevant laws and
regulations – will influence the security aspects of the system (Islam, Mouratidis, and
Jürjens, 2011). Security requirements analysis and security-related decision making
requiring the analysis of personal and organisational goals of the stakeholders
participating in the system due to the subjective nature of security are important (Elahi
et al., 2010). The challenge for those who develop or change information systems is
that stakeholders have conflicting requirements with respect to the assets that
comprise the system (Fabian et al., 2010).

In this study we have considered: (a) how the vagaries of the risk attitude (Hillson and
Murray-Webster, 2007) can be translated into programmable security requirements;
(b) how to balance the security requirements with risk appetite of the organisation as
represented by the security controls it embraces (ISO/IEC 27001, 2013); and (c) how
the balance of risk appetite and attitude can be measured and assured.

Systems that trade security for ease of use are likely to be used incorrectly resulting in
security risk which may include wilful circumvention (Beckles, B et al., 2005). In this
paper we look at the early stages of development and discuss the good, the bad, and
the ugly in the problem space of building security into an information system so that it
does not stand out as a feature whilst the system is in use (Bevan, 1995) and then
carry this through to test the method with users. We suggest that this practice is a
critical success factor to enable the usability of a system at its simplest and to
encourage acceptable use of the system at its best.

If security is implemented well then it will be invisible to the users. However if it is
implemented badly then security controls are in place but their implementation makes
for inelegant use of the system, and in the worst case scenario poor consideration of
security in the realisation of requirements can lead to anguish where users create their
own workarounds (Adams and Sasse, 1999) and data migrates to the unintentional
information system.
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We shall suggest that the challenge of articulating security requirements may be met
by enabling secure systems operation through a framework for user liberation, and
conclude with an assessment of examples where it would appear that by accident or
by design, the mechanisms to achieve security objectives through the system in use
have been successful.

2.0

The problem space: unintentional information systems

There is a challenge to find those who do not pay sufficient attention to risk and the
very human nature of losing their sense of emotional literacy in an effort to achieve
personal goals or just to get the job done (Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2007). We
have articulated this in our research questions (see 1.0 Introduction above). Ignoring
risk may have no malicious intent but it may have significant consequences well
beyond the immediate environment of the individual. Even shocks that can trigger
appropriate emotions at one time may be relatively short lasting. For example, wouldbe Liverpool football club spectators who wanted to break into the Champions League
final (23 May 2007) against AC Milan (McNulty, 2007) where a lack of available
tickets had led to their exclusion from the ground. The emotions governing their
desire to see the game overcame their appreciation of what had happened at a match
(15 April 1989) between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest when 96 people died after
supporters tried to enter an already overcrowded stadium (BBC News, 2009). The
challenge is to maintain an awareness of the risks to many when individuals distance
themselves from the consequences of their actions. Information systems not only need
to provide opportunity to share and transform information but also need to remind
users of the outcomes of their actions of using the system. For example, what
consideration do people give to the consequences of publishing holiday photographs
or personal information on a ‘Web 2.0’ social network (House of Lords, 2007) and
how much thought does a user give to continuing e-mail correspondence using the
‘Reply-to-All’ function? At the other extreme, how many are prevented from making
decisions or taking actions which would be unlikely to lead to a risk being realised?
There is a tendency for overcompensating day-to-day; to be become obsessed with the
high impact, low probability risk. For a comprehensive approach, sensitivity to the
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weltanschauung of each user is required as it could be said that risk is in the eye of the
beholder.
The term ‘unintentional information systems’ was coined by Professor Bob Wood
(Dresner, 2011) to describe the movement of data from the intended places of
processing, transit, and storage to places where that data should not be. The data is
handled by people outside the information system that was designed for it by
legitimate users who want to do things their way, or by nefarious ‘users’ who have
their own objectives – the system ‘misuse’ case.

Human factors are still not sufficiently addressed in the process of engineering secure
software systems (Faily and Flechais, 2010). It is important to ground usability
decisions in information gathered about real people, potentially including them in the
design process (ibid.). Security lock-down should not result in security lock out. There
should be no expectations that the user will apply much thought process to the reasons
for having to navigate security controls when they stand between a risk – however
calculated and however likely – and getting a job done. The calamity occurs when the
workaround damages the workflow resulting in stunted operations or worse – a failure
to operate. The intentional, designed system is no longer able to protect data and any
capability in the system for self-preservation (business continuity) is moot.

This work is needed to improve security by default without which there will be active
failures through both technical and social vulnerabilities (Flechais, Sasse, and Hailes.
2003) As well as designing for the people who will use them, secure systems also
need to be designed for the environment they will be used in. Delivering security for
the user means a balance of human factors with security requirements so that an
acceptable level of risk is maintained.

3.0

Literature review

3.1

The challenge of articulating non-functional requirements

Information system acquisition, development, and maintenance needs to have a
complete and consistent set of security requirements – within itself and with relation
to the other requirements for the system (Fabian et al., 2010).
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Although many factors contribute to information system failures, the concentration
and emphasis on the early phases of development holds particular significance. Every
system of consequence needs good requirements (Orr, 2004). Without knowing the
requirements of customers and users it is difficult to build the right product
(Kauppinen, 2005) and without good requirements, project risks, such as costs,
schedules and performance, increase dramatically (Orr, 2004). In spite of many
research efforts and the development of a range of Requirements Engineering (RE)
techniques for a system’s functionality, system failures still continue to be attributed
to, among other factors, requirements issues.
Crosby’s Quality Management Grid (Crosby, 1979) shows the cost of quality, based
on removing defects. The sooner the defects are removed in the life cycle, the reduced
cost of removal, and the increased maturity of the organisation required to achieve
this. Security flaws may be expressed as quality defects. Security is a non-functional
requirement or a primary system/software quality characteristic (BS ISO/IEC 25010,
2011) so information security vulnerabilities and breaches are manifestations of
quality defects and can therefore be evaluated using Crosby’s grid.

The most challenging projects often involve multiple stakeholders from differing
organisations, subcontractors, divisions, etc., who may have a diversity of expertise,
come from different organisational cultures and frequently have competing goals.
When requirements are based on information gained from users or customers, there is
a link to project success and a lower proportion of Requirements Engineering in the
project costs (Kujala et al., 2005). However since people involved in RE processes
(Alexander, 2007) have various roles (for example, user representative, system
developer, maintenance staff, financial officer), together with different skills and
knowledge, each has his or her own understanding of the system to be built or
changed (Pohl, 1994; Krogstie and Solvberg, 2003). And there is a risk of losing sight
of the security requirements when an incomplete set of users are consulted (Carr,
Konda et al., 1993).
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Typically requirements stem from two main sources, namely user-defined – usage
world – and domain-imposed – subject world (Jarke and Pohl, 1993; Rolland and
Prakash, 2000).

Security requirements are consequences of threats to the system (Fabian et al., 2010).
A threat is posed by someone – who may be a counter-stakeholder – or something that
threatens something that stakeholder values (ibid). Conflicting stakeholder views
introduce the challenge of conflicting requirements. All views must be considered to
synthesise a consistent set of system requirements. A process of reconciliation and
compromise is needed to effect this to a level of acceptable risk to all stakeholders and
ultimately the system owner.

The user can be locked out by security, either literally or psychologically (Adams and
Sasse, 1999). This can result in stunted operations and system operational failure. This
threatens the ability to protect data and the ability for self-preservation in a state of
business continuity. However security risk countermeasures are necessary to allow an
information system to protect, operate and self-preserve. Therefore human factors
need to be balanced with security requirements. We shall show how the barometer of
success can be shown in a heat map (see Figure 3).

People who specify requirements for products or services that store and process
information may find that the association of certain words can either inhibit or enable
specifications that require interpretation to move from intention to realisation. Stating
that an information system must be, for example, ‘secure’ may result in the
implementation of hardware, software, and processes which restrict access to such an
extent that users – with no malicious intention – work around the security constraints
and inject information into unintentional information systems or, conversely fail to
realise the possible protection with safe outcomes. Security is a state. It is affected by
the realisation of risks to that state. Management of risk in the context of information
security and cyber security is attributed to the application of controls which may vary
from anywhere between 4 or 35 (Australia, 2012) and 20 critical controls (SANS,
2013) to 135 (ISO/IEC 27002) and many more (NIST 2013, HIPAA 1996, PCI DSS
2010). The standards that set out these controls do little to separate out clear risk
management processes and the feedback they require to adjust the state of security
-6-

within acceptable boundaries that match risk appetite. A requirements specification is
challenged with being detailed enough to represent complexity whilst being simple
enough to be unambiguous and understandable and not attenuating the description of
the information system it models. It risks (sic!) creating requirements for controls
whose combined complexity dampens the ability to manage quality attributes such as
security.

The challenge is how much can we dare to tamper with the constraint of security locks
to free the user and how do we turn the security controls into non-functional
requirements meeting obligations of protection and system objectives simultaneously.
This is the risk and requirements conundrum that we address in this paper. We do this
by proposing a framework (Figure 2) for user liberation that may reduce the risk of
security incidents and increase the risk of successful operations. The term ‘risk’ is
used to mean both negative and positive possibilities throughout this paper to divorce
the usual association where risk management is defined in terms of negative
connotations.

3.2

Security: the good, the bad and the ugly

Poor security has been said to be worse than no security (Townsend, 2000) because it
is false security. However, we propose that at least some security is better than none
providing that it doesn’t eschew reliance.
Any measure of security is transient and requires periodic – if not frequent – reevaluation. The information that users are provided with needs to be understandable.
The temptation to label users as ‘the weakest link’ (Sasse, Brostoff, and Weirich
2001) should not lead to a belief that user education will be a panacea (Ranum, 2005).
It should however be used to suggest that careful elicitation of user-oriented
requirements may be applied to treat the risks from the detected human
vulnerabilities. These treatments may include user education but only from the
perspective that any education will only be effective if users believe in the risk (Sasse,
2003), and cost effective, secure systems design (Flechais, Sasse, and Hailes, 2003)
which sets policies and targets to assure risk management within the context of the
software in use (the policies and targets being the regulators of the protection of
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information in the system). The software needs to believe in the risk on behalf of the
users. Reworking the software will be desirable but is unlikely to have the speed of
return that is needed – standards beyond those for good development practices will be
required, as well as enticing the implementation of the good practices which are
already known.

The obligation is on the system designers to develop systems that enable the
fulfilment of objectives. Security controls need to be unobtrusive to the honest user
but not to those that would seek to damage the system.

3.3

Quality and security engineering in software

Although there are a number of security Requirements Engineering methods few take
into consideration different stakeholder views, attitudes or appetites to risk. Such
methods

include

Security

Quality Requirements

Engineering

Methodology

(SQUARE) (Mead et al., 2005); KAOS (van Lamsweerde, 2007); Secure Tropos
(Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007; Masscci and Zannone, 2006); Secure i* (Liu, Yu and
Mylopoulos, 2003); Multilateral Security Requirements Analysis (MSRA) (Gurses,
Berendt and Santen, 2006). MSRA also proposes steps to address the issue of
contradictory security concerns amongst stakeholders where compromises must be
made. However MSRA does not cover threats. UML based approaches such as
Misuse Cases, Secure UML and UMLsec do not take environmental issues into
account. Misuse cases allow early focus on security by describing security threats and
then requirements without going into design (Sindre and Opdahl, 2005). Alexander
(2002) used misuse cases to successfully determine threats and requirements and
subsequent resolution of design conflicts. And Breivik (2002) used misuse cases to
represent security threats from the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP,
2001) in pattern form. However Misuse cases are not equally suitable for all kinds of
threats and they could lead to analysis paralysis due to weak method guidelines.

Security requirements were able to be leveraged successfully with usability and cost
constraints taken into consideration within SECUR, an RFID-based off-site data
storage management system that significantly improves the security of the backup
data life cycle (Lopez-Carmona et al., 2010). This was achieved through arranging
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security controls in a set of ten security tiers, of which the level of security increases
with high level tiers. Houmb et al (2010) applied the SecReq approach to elicit
security requirements for Internet Protocol Television (IPTV). SecReq, a security
standard ISO 14508 Common Criteria driven security requirements elicitation and
tracing approach, that also uses a heuristics requirements editor and UMLsec. This
made it possible to gain repeatable feedback from core stakeholders throughout the
requirements elicitation process.

Elahi et al (2010) proposed a requirements engineering framework to support the
elicitation of security requirements based on the effects of vulnerabilities on security
requirements. However the framework assumes knowledge of vulnerabilities ,
potential attacks and countermeasures or that they can obtain such information.

4.0

Designing successful security requirements

Security is a non-functional requirement of an information system (BS ISO/IEC
25010, 2011) that must be as clearly defined as the colours, (data-formatting for
example) that are usually associated with other quality attributes, such as usability or
interoperability. However, words associated with the specification of security are so
riddled with their own semiotic baggage that they are either used inappropriately, too
often, too little, or not at all. Words such as ‘control’, ‘restrict’, ‘legal’, or even ‘risk’
suggest the red terminology of protection or danger and suggest barriers to the user.

In the specification of information systems that handle data in a way that is
commensurate with all reasonable expectations of the impact resulting in compromise
to their confidentiality, integrity, or availability, we need a method to build
information systems that can be adapted to the risk literacy of both those who specify
the information system and those who must apply that specification in development,
implementation or use. It is the manifestation of the human behaviour principle of IT
governance (BS ISO/IEC 38500, 2008). This would manifest in a method to support
the development of secure information systems by reducing the risk of inappropriate
data processing and increasing the risk of containing the information in an accurate
state and available where it is genuinely needed. Success is when a requirement is
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identified and the security measures increase the likelihood that requirements will be
realised and are not by-passed in use.

Designing is a necessary activity amongst stakeholders when working towards a
solution for an information system which is compatible with their needs. Everyone
designs who devises courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into
preferred ones (Simon, 1969).
Design thinking enables the creation of ideas that better meet consumers’ needs and
desires, rather than making an already developed idea more attractive (Brown, 2008).
It is also often seen as a way of dealing with complex problems in systems
development (Saffer, 2005). This enables not only the determination of stakeholders’
needs but also the best possible outcome to be ascertained in the balance between
business impact (CESG, 2009), and end user contentment (Adams and Sasse, 1999).

5.0

A Framework for user security liberation

5.1

Methodology

The objective of this research was to determine whether the attitudes of individuals to
risk may be usefully correlated to the acceptable level of risk that is expected by the
‘risk culture’ in which they work. Knowing this to be true, and how so, is a foundation
for understanding what training, improved awareness, or other mechanisms - namely
applying standards as regulators (Beer, 1993) or controls - are needed for changes in
risk culture or to maintain a current, appropriate risk culture. This was to be tested by
creating a scale of measurement for attitudes to risk. A questionnaire was constructed
to determine where on the scale a user should be placed and whether they sit within,
or outside, the attitude that is acceptable to the owner of the network. The creation and
refinement of the questionnaire and the evaluation of the responses determines the
application of the method as a practical tool to evaluate the appropriateness of
implemented policies (or standards) for risk management in information systems.
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5.2

Profiling the user

The methodology complements the technical and quasi-technical countermeasures
deployed for use against well-known outsider threats such as hackers or the malicious
software of criminal programmers. Technical measures would include intrusion
detection and prevention systems, antivirus or spyware detection and removal
programs and firewalls (both hardware and software). Quasi-technical measures
comprise a technical implementation which may, for example, use technology to
distract a criminal from gaining inappropriate access to a computer network such as a
honeypot which may imitate a legitimate network or part of a network with otherwise
redundant information stored thereon. The common characteristics were isolated and
are represented by the formula in Figure 1 which is explained below:

System
Vulnerability at
the point of use

=

Environmental circumstances + Personal
circumstance + Path(s) + ICT literacy
+ Risk literacy + Emotional literacy

=

Knowledge of risk + Knowledge of treatment
+ Willingness to deploy treatment

Where
Risk Literacy

Figure 1. Profiling the user in an information system

The context in which a type of person or organisational role is assessed for being a
human vulnerability has the two aspects of environmental circumstances of where
they use information systems (often a workplace), and a set of personal circumstances
or profile. The environmental circumstances were considered in the questions (and the
rules designed to evaluate the results) by taking into account the environment and
context in which an individual is operating. The method recognises that where a user
engages with a network, the context of use will depend on the profile of the user in
terms of their ICT skills, the tasks that the user expects, or is expected, to achieve, the
equipment such as hardware or software that gives the user access, the physical and
social environments in which engagement takes place, and the stability of the
organisation in terms of its existence or propensity for change. For example,
appropriate risk taking for a private individual accessing personal e-mail with a
mobile device is not likely to be appropriate for another user engaging with a network
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managing a safety-critical SCADA system. However, common areas that would
secure the use of both would appear in the attitude tests for all users.

The presence or absence of expected security measures and the propensity for users to
show emotional intelligence in the face of risk were allocated scores to rank the
quality of the security controls and the reaction to everyday threats. This created a
weighted ranking method that allowed quantitative representation of essentially
qualitative measures. Part of the inherent challenge of collecting information for this
type of analysis is in the accuracy of the responses and hence the quality of
information collected. Table 1. Options for investigation, shows how segregating the
respondents considered the quality of information by providing some independent
judgement. This table considers who can offer the best answers to questions about the
organisation with the research objective of eliminating bias in the responses. This
control is centred on having someone profile the respondent to the questionnaire first.
This improves quality of the analysis of the responses based on the assumptions (that
is, acceptable risk) that the supervisor and the individual will not collude, or that the
response should not be an opportunity to transfer risk from supervisor to individual.
Again, quality assurance would expect the supervisor to undergo the same scrutiny
(Quis custodiet ipsos custodes – Who will keep watch over the guardians?).
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Questions answered by:
Options

(a) Questions about

(b)

the Organisation

Questions

Relative
(c) Questions

about general

about specific

network users/

individual(s)

quality of
data
expected
1 = low

stakeholders

5 = high.
1

Supervisor/

Supervisor/

Security or Risk officer

Security or Risk

N/A

2

officer
2

Supervisor/
Security or Risk officer

3

Supervisor/
Security or Risk officer

4

Supervisor/

N/A

Security or Risk officer

N/A

Specific individual

Supervisor/

Profile information by

Security or Risk officer

the Supervisor, Security
N/A

or Risk officer; Purely

3

4

5

risk attitude questions by
the specific individual
Table 1. Options for investigation

5.3

The liberating route map

Figure 1 shows the proposed User Liberation Framework. This framework comprises
the key components of a process to elicit and manage the security requirements that
can be reflected in a system’s security controls. These controls would be sensitive to
the attitude of the users who are responsible for handling information and are to be
built into the system (Bryant, 2013) to assure the steering of the information with the
boundaries necessary to achieve the business objectives for which the system was
intended. The organisation’s risk appetite would be assessed using the active security
control metrics, followed by assessment of individuals’ risk attitude using reactions to
scenarios relevant to the organisation. A comparison of the risk appetite to risk
attitude would produce a value to be used in the heat map (Figure 3) and inform
iterations of security requirements. It is particularly pertinent to consider both
organisational and stakeholder influences on requirements, as Chmura and Crockett
(1995) note that when defining functional and non-functional requirements
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individuals often consider only their personal requirements, without thinking about

Heat map
(see Figure 3)

the company’s overall goals.

Figure 2. User Liberation Framework
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Key to all information security management is the understanding of the target of
protection (BS ISO/IEC 27001:2013) and if not already know, the entry point for the
framework is asset discovery to enable considered and appropriate controls to be
selected rather than creating overly complex control matrices to protect items that are
no longer important or do not exist. The axes on the heat map are created by
establishing as series of questions that establish the relative measure of the
organisations attitude to risk (Y axis) as benchmarked by the degree to which the
organisation has adopted identified controls from the risk-based information security
standard ISO/IEC 27001. This is plotted against a weighted ranking of an individual’s
attitude to risk (X axis). So, questions are asked to discover (for example) whether
information risk is regularly addressed in projects, operations/IT service delivery, and
at board level, whether staff may use their own IT equipment for business use (PCs,
telephones, PDAs, USB sticks/pen drives). These questions are designed to paint a
risk landscape to understand if the environment that the users are to be found in
expose day-to-day, system agnostic risk and does something to protect against the
losses that may be caused by their realisation. The stability of the organisation is itself
scrutinised with consideration of whether it is undergoing, likely to undergo, or may
be rumoured to be undergoing some merger or acquisition or internal reorganisation.
Questions look at practices such as the place of screening staff screened for
background, qualifications, during selection and during changes of employment and
their access to information tailored accordingly. This considers the arrangements that
change unskilled users to skilled individuals who may be expected to manage some
risk as an instinctive reaction. This is balanced with the question as to whether staff
have their work monitored for accuracy for a period until competency through
experience is assured or other validation mechanism is deemed sufficient. The effect
of the user on the reference architecture is considered by asking if alterations to how
company equipment is set up can only be done through qualified staff.

The richness of the security environment is weighted by the answer format which
ranks answers as describing a better quality of environment for working securely on
the assumption that the best security control is not only implemented but that it should
also be documented, communicated, and audited. The worst case is where there is no
policy to say whether a control is used or not.
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Attitudes to risk are measured by a similar system of representing responses as to the
level of concern that the interviewee shows for good and bad information security
practices – a combination of risk and emotional literacy. Whether or not the user tends
towards the high-risk profile is analysed by whether they feel threatened, unfamiliar,
uncommitted to, or comfortable with the risk and/or the risk treatment that is present
or applied respectively.

Figure 3. Heat map for showing a balance of human factors with security controls

In the ideal zone (Figure 3) - with low attitude to risk and low appetite for risk
values - there is a good balance of implemented and audited security policy with staff
attitudes. A low attitude to risk and high appetite for risk may mean that an
organisation with weak security may rely on its staff to protect itself from risk. In
contrast a high attitude to risk and low appetite to risk indicates that the organisation
is wholly reliant on enforced security policy to protect itself from risk. And a high
attitude to risk and high appetite for risk indicates that an organisation with weak
security cannot rely on its staff to protect itself from risk.
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5.4

Utility – deriving requirements from the framework

The heat map is the pivotal tool for deriving requirements that should be built in to the
system – as determined by the Trustworthy Software Framework, (Bryant, 2013). It
has been designed to recognise that attitudes are harder to change than security policy
and so it can be experimented with to adjust the controls of the system (ISO/IEC
27001 and ISO/IEC 27002, 2013) to bring the information systems plotted exposure
to risk into an acceptable zone on the heat map. The controls can be defined as system
requirements and managed through the acquisition process.

The more sensitive problem of the attitude of the user can be tackled by awareness
education which can be benchmarked for progress using the attitude questions that are
used to plot the people component of the heat map.

The sensitivity of the scale was tested by investigating the development environment
of the IT department of a County Constabulary. The department comprises system
designers, implementers, support and maintenance staff, and management and
administration. The department is responsible systems that handling information
classified to Business Impact Level 3 (defined as confidential according to HMG
Infosec Standard No. 1, CESG, 2009). The education programme that offered the
opportunity to validate the security awareness benchmarking was requested by the
organisation’s information security officer so that he could discharge its obligations
under government requirements for mandatory information assurance training.
Information assurance is defined by CESG as ‘the confidence that information
systems will protect the information they carry and will function as they need to,
when they need to, under the control of legitimate users’. The training was designed
specifically for the IT department. This realised the responsibility of system
developers to manage requirements and create systems where usability would not be
compromised by the poor design of the security controls (Flechais, Sasse, Hailes,
2003). Each session comprised a presentation with an exercise to test the risk
awareness of the staff. It is worthwhile noting that the IT department agreed to the
training under sufferance as it was not seen to be a priority.
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In several training sessions the questions measuring risk attitude were completed at
the start and end of the session and benchmarked against the original answers. The
results were used to see if the training had improved the attitude of those attending by
increasing their awareness of risk and what was considered as acceptable treatments
for those risks. That is, the awareness of which risk countermeasures –
controls - needed to be built into the systems that they develop, maintain, or use.

The IT department comprised 83 staff who were involved with the development,
support, and maintenance of information and communication systems for the
organisation, and administrative support for the department. The staff attended the
training sessions in groups of 12 or less with little or no knowledge of why they were
required to attend. Each session started with an explanation followed by a review of
their information security attitude. This was taken with the risk appetite measure for
the organisation which had been calculated by interviewing the information security
officer using the questions about the organisation’s status, and the content and quality
of deployment of the organisation’s information risk management policies. His
responses were added to the spreadsheet, leaving the questions about the local attitude
to risk to be asked during training sessions with the IT department. This plot was
made with the version of the questions used by the in-depth questionnaire so that the
trainees could not only see where they were placed in relation to themselves before
and after the training but also with respect to other organisations. An example from
one session is shown in Figure 4. The objective was to show the collective risk
attitude of each group.

The training session for each group contained material to educate attendees in the
basics of information assurance, teach them how to apply proportionate treatments to
information risk, and help them appreciate the stakeholders who will make risk
treatment effective. This was exercised with a fictional case study about handling
sensitive information to which the controls of BS ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) had to be
applied to link risks with policies and countermeasures.
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5.5

Measuring the attitude of the user

Seven sessions were run which included most of the department in the training. As the
programme was run, it became more and more challenging to deliver the sessions
with some of those attending being distracted by their perception that the training was
a low priority in relation to their day-to-day responsibilities. Priority was given to
delivering the presentation material and encouraging participation in discussion and
the risk treatment exercise. Only three of the seven sessions completed the
benchmarking exercise. The results are shown in Table 2.

Session 1

Session 2

Session 3

Appetite

Attitude

Appetite

Attitude

Score

Score

Score

Score

Training session: first measure

301

324

486

287

Central Government

424

1698

1698

1698

Construction

396

861

861

861

Law

426

1797

1797

1797

Registered Social Landlord

442

1854

1854

1854

Local Government

434

886

886

886

Insurance

675

752

752

752

Education

432

803

803

803

Software

613

694

694

694

Utilities

463

886

886

886

Gambling

460

848

848

848

Local Government

512

800

800

800

Charity

403

800

800

800

Healthcare

473

925

925

925

Training session: second measure

301

209

137

137

Table 2. Before and after training – measures of risk attitude
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5.6

Analysis of the results

In all sessions, the coordinates of the group under scrutiny were moved further into
the heart of the green zone of the chart. Figure 4 shows the improvement measured
from the first session. It is worth noting that the organisation scored well from the
outset with regard to both risk appetite and risk attitude. This is likely to be because of
the nature of the organisation’s work which require it to habitually regard security as
important as part of its business which often requires it to enforce security for others.
This is further exemplified by the existence of the full time information security
officer and the mandate for the information security awareness training.

Figure 4. Improvement in risk and treatment awareness measured in the first session of training

6.0

Conclusions and future work

There is a clear need for a solid foundation to be established for information systems
development, as an important detail missed at an early stage can lead to large
problems later in development. The User Liberation Framework (Figure 2) presented
in this paper focuses on the early stages of IS development and attempts to measure
the balance of an organisation or community’s risk appetite with the risk attitudes of
its members.
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Research tends to concentrate on what is required in terms of system security from an
organisational perspective rather than focusing on the human usability aspect,
showing the causal links between security breaches and people’s behaviour and the
system. There also tends to be a gap between organisational expectations and user
actions and technical capabilities. For example research by Mannan and van Oorschot,
(2007) highlighted the emerging gap between banks’ expectations and users’ actions
related to security requirements of online banking.

In this study we have shown: the opportunity provided by modelling the human
vulnerabilities in information systems to synthesise programmable security
requirements (a), how the realisation of those requirements can be used to check the
balance of security requirements with risk appetite of the organisation as represented
by the security controls it embraces (b), and how the balance of risk appetite and
attitude can be measured and assured by representing them on a heat map (c).

Supporting research around the language of risk is still needed to support the
promulgation of a tool for detecting human vulnerabilities in information systems.
Are the terms risk attitude and risk appetite sufficiently defined and understood? How
does one describe appetite which may vary from one organisation to another, yet be
good enough for each depending on the risk treatments deployed and the respective
residual risk that remains? Some of this is addressed in the model for connecting
organisations with a standards-based approach (Dresner and Wood, 2007). The term
good is used here to describe individuals who appreciate their responsibilities to
manage a degree of risk and whose awareness encompasses the organisational
measures in place to allow risk-managed access to the information system.
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